Abstract-Long Term Evolution (LTE) networks designed by 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) represent a widespread technology. LTE is mainly influenced by high data rates, minimum delay and the capacity due to scalable bandwidth and its flexibility. With the rapid and widespread use LTE networks, and increase the use in data/video transmission and Internet applications in general, accordingly, the challenges of securing and speeding up data communication in such networks is also increased. Authentication in LTE networks is very important process because most of the coming attacks occur during this stage. Attackers try to be authenticated and then launch the network resources and prevent the legitimate users from the network services. The basics of Extensible Authentication Protocol-Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA) are used in LTE AKA protocol which is called Evolved Packet System AKA (EPS-AKA) protocol to secure LTE network, However it still suffers from various vulnerabilities such as disclosure of the user identity, computational overhead, Man In The Middle (MITM) attack and authentication delay. In this paper, an Efficient EPS-AKA protocol (EEPS-AKA) is proposed to overcome those problems. The proposed protocol is based on the Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange (SPEKE) protocol. Compared to previous proposed methods, our method is faster, since it uses a secret key method which is faster than certificate-based methods, In addition, the size of messages exchanged between User Equipment (UE) and Home Subscriber Server (HSS) is reduced, this reduces authentication delay and storage overhead effectively. The automated validation of internet security protocols and applications (AVISPA) tool is used to provide a formal verification. Results show that the proposed EEPS-AKA is efficient and secure against active and passive attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) started in November 2004 to define the long-term evolution of the Universal Mobile Telephone System (UMTS) which was also one of 3GPP projects. The 3GPP has many other projects such as High Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSPDA), High Speed Uplink Packet Access (HSUPA), Time-Division Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA), System Architecture Evolution(SAE) and Long Term Evolution(LTE) release 8. The next step of LTE is LTE release 10 or LTE-Advanced where multiple carriers have been aggregated to provide wider bandwidth and improved antenna technologies have been used in both direction uplink and downlink. The widespread use of 4th Generation (4G) networks leads to more needs of high bit rate, less delay in such networks. Moreover the wireless nature in the LTE networks leads to exponential proliferation of vulnerabilities, deficiencies, eavesdroppers and attacks, hence, the wireless security management becomes encouraging environment for a large number of studies and research. The authentication and key agreement protocol is an important component in the LTE networks, and plays a key role in the security in such networks. The 3GPP project continues in evaluating and developing the AKA protocol as a part of the 3GPP's security system. Starting from 2G-AKA [1] , 3G-AKA [2] or UMTS-AKA and reaching to EPS-AKA [3] for 4G networks. The 3G-AKA has been developed based on 2G security mechanism to meet the requirements of 3G networks and to overcome the deficiencies of 2G-AKA protocol. However, there are some deficiencies such as tapping users identity and difficulty of sequence numbers, etc. Recently, 3GPP has adopted EPS-AKA protocol for the next generation networks LTE. The framework of 3G-AKA is retained with improvements in security and performance. The Access Security Management Entity (ASME) is hosted in the Mobile Management Entity (MME) to provide access security and to be considered as a key distributor in the EPS-AKA protocol. Despite its safety and efficacy, EPS-AKA does not provide full protection for LTE networks and suffers from several drawbacks such as user identity attacks, communication cost, and bandwidth consumption. The user identity can be revealed when the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) is sent in clear text in the first connection, which allows user identity attack, MME can not retrieve IMSI using the Globally Unique Temporary Identity (GUTI), when visiting a new MME, or when a fake eNB request IMSI from UE [4]. Many solutions and protocols have been proposed in several studies to address those drawbacks, and improve the performance of EPS-AKA, but there has been no a perfect solution so far. Unlike the previous solutions where the public key Infrastructure (PKI) and certificate-based solutions have been used, a shared key mechanism is used in this work, and lead to a decrease in the authentication delay and communication cost. In this paper, we present the limitations of previous works in EPS-AKA mechanism, then, an efficient EPS-AKA protocol is proposed using a simple and strong mechanism based on SPEKE protocol with some improvements to be adapted with LTE architecture. The shared secret key is not exchanged, instead it is computed using a strong method in UE and Home Subscriber Server (HSS) and used to protect the IMSI.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses in some depth the overview of EAP protocol and methods; it also presents the methods that are used in this paper. Section III describes the proposed EEPS-AKA authentication method. Section IV provides security analysis of the proposed method, and its performance compared to other methods. Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND A. EPS-AKA protocol overview
LTE System has two main networks, E-UTRAN which is the access network (a network of eNBs), and the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) which is the core network, this structure makes LTE simple, scalable and efficient. LTE architecture including the Serving Gateway (SGW) and the Packet Data Network Gateway (P-GW) are illustrated in Figure 1 . LTE uses Access security mechanism for authentication and key agreement between UE and the eNB, It also uses handover key management to refresh the session keys securely when UE moves from one eNB to other one to mitigate the attacks caused by a malicious BS, these mechanisms called authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) which is considered as LTE security mechanism. AKA provides a mutual authentication between UE and eNB and it also provides key agreement.
EPS-AKA protocol is the last version of UMTS-AKA, where the improvements added have raised the degree of security, but made the protocol more complex. The components that play a part during EPS-AKA authentication protocol are as follow :
1) UE and Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM).
2) Enhanced Node Base station (eNB), and Mobility Management Equipment (MME). 3) Home Subscriber Server (HSS). The procedure starts when eNB sends a user identity request to UE, the details of the protocol are illustrated in Figure 2 and the following steps : 1) When the UE receives the user identity request, it sends its identity (IMSI) in the user identity response message to eNB which forwards it to MME.
2) MME sends the received IMSI with its identity and network type in the data authentication request message to HSS.
3) When receiving the data authentication request, the HSS uses long term key K shared with UE, it also uses two types of functions, message authentication functions f1, f1, and f2; and key generation functions f3, f4, f5, and f5 to computes the EPS authentication vectors as follows:
key is the main difference between UMTS-AKA and EPS-AKA.
4) AVs are sent to MME in the data authentication response message.
5) Upon the receipt of AVs from HSS, MME forwards only RAND and AUTN with a Key set identifier KSI ASM E to UE in the user authentication request message. KSI ASM E is used by UE and MME to identify K ASM E .
6) UE receives the message, extracts SQN H , computes the expected MAC (XMAC) and checks if matched with the MAC received in AUTN for freshness reasons, then it checks the SQN H received from HSS with its SQN if one of the two checks fails it sends errors, otherwise it computes the response RES and sends it to MME and computes the K ASM E .
7) The MME check the RES received from UE and XRES received from HSS, if they are equal it sends a success message to UE and the EPS-AKA procedure is successfully completed.
B. SPEKE Method Overview
EAP-SPEKE is one of the strongest EAP methods. It is based on password that is shared only between peer and authenticator. In general, EAP-SPEKE is easier to setup than certificate based authentication methods and it is resistant to both active and passive attacks such as MITM, replay, password sniffing and brute force. It generates a strong session key that can be used in data encryption. The password or Id in this method can be saved in a manner not easily detectable by attacks. In this method, peer/MS and authenticator/AS share a password psw and use a large safe prime p and a hash function h. MS and AS calculate the generator g of the prime where g = H(psw) 2 mod p. MS computes and sends A to AS where A = g a mod p and a is MS's secret value. Then the AS computes the parameters to generate B where B = g b mod p and b is AS's secret value, then it computes the session key Ks as Ks = A b mod p, it chooses a random value Rb, encrypts it using Ks and sends it to MS. After that, MS computes Ks as Ks = B a mod p, it chooses a random value Ra, encrypts Ra and Rb using Ks, then it sends Ks(Ra, Rb) to AS. AS verify the received Rb with its value to authenticate MS, if matched, it encrypts the received Ra by Ks and sends it to MS. MS verifies AS by checking received Ra with its value. At this point the mutual authentication is completed. We improve SPEKE protocol to generate stronger keys and apply it in our proposed method with some adaptation to provide a secure exchange to the user identity in LTE networks. Figure  3 illustrates the mechanism of SPEKE protocol.
C. Related Work
Many papers suggested solutions directly to secure the network against certain types of attacks such as MITM, user disclosure, brute force, Reply and etc, while others have worked to improve the performance of AKA authentication mechanism in LTE networks in terms of authentication delay, authentication cost, bandwidth, and energy consumption.
One of those solutions has been presented in [5] in which, the authors have proposed a fast authentication method called (EAP-FAKA) to enhance the original AKA method by reducing the authentication delay, signaling cost and satisfying the security properties. EAP-FAKA is based on Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and symmetric cryptosystem. The main idea in this method is to protect the UE identity (IMSI) Fig. 3 . SPEKE Authentication protocol by using a temporary ID and generating CK, IK keys using a pre-shared secret keys.
Another solution has been provided in [6] , where the authors have proposed a new authentication method by improving the EPS-AKA. The new authentication method is based on proxy signature to solve the vulnerabilities in the handover process such as system complexity caused by multiple key management mechanisms, handover delay caused by exchanging messages between UE and MME, and the backward secrecy. The proposed method includes two phases, initial attach phase to prepare the next handover authentication and uniform handover authentication phase to complete a mutual authentication between UE and the new eNB.
The authors in [7] have analyzed the EPS-AKA and its vulnerabilities, The Idea of the proposed method is to modify the AV by replacing some fields such as AUTN.SQN, AUTN.MAC by AUTN.CID, AUTN.RESUE respectively. The reason for this modification is to provide a full authentication between USIM and MME and to eliminate the need for extra steps for deriving IC, CK as in EPS-AKA, however some entities such as ESIM needs a new subscriber module, the new AV is not fully compatible with EPS-AV and the interworking still needs to be detailed.
On the other hand, the authors in [8] have proposed an improved AKA (I-AKA) to reduce the power consumption utilized by authentication steps and as well as to secure the authentication process against DoS attacks. The authors discussed the network layer authentication and the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) service layer authentication, they improved the network authentication (EPS-AKA) by using IP Multimedia Private-user Identity (IMPI) and using a new key hierarchy for the IMS authentication.
In [9] the vulnerabilities of EAP-AKA such as IMSI disclosure, MITM, bandwidth consumption, lack of forward secrecy, computational overhead, and SQN synchronization have been discussed, a new AKA authentication protocol based on EAP-AKA is proposed by combining Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman(ECDH) and symmetric key cryptosystem to overcome those vulnerabilities. The proposed method prevents reply, MITM attacks by using timestamp and authenticating AP and it provides user privacy by using a temporary user identity, however verifying the solutions provided is required.
An enhancements on AKA protocol called Enhancement Mobile Security and User Confidentiality (EMSUCU ) for UMTS have been proposed in [10] to overcome some problems such as user identity disclosure and secret key exposure. The idea of EMSUCU protocol is to encrypt the permenant identity of UE (IMSI) and use the encrypted IMSI whenever the temporary IMSI can not be used. the new protocol enhanced EMSUCU in some aspects such as, using hash function instead of encryption functions to speed up the procedure, increasing the level of security by increasing the size of key (Kc) by using new security function f11 to generate the key Kc that used to encrypt the IMSI, eliminating the use of the shared key and protecting the exchanged message of AKA protocol that contains (RAND, RES, AUTN, CK, IK).
In the same subject, the work in [11] , has studied the EPS-AKA protocol and addressed some issues such as user identity and how to protect the users from malicious MME. The authors proposed a modified AKA protocol called hybrid scheme HSK-AKA based on the method proposed in [12] . HSK-AKA protocol minimizes using of public key cryptography by using it in digital signature and using symmetric key cryptography in USIM functions to reduce the energy consumption. It achieves better performance compared to some protocols such as SE-AKA [13] in terms of computational overhead and delay as well as fulfill the security requirements.
In [14] , the authors have analyzed the shortages of the EPS AKA mechanism such as disclosure of user identity and MITM attack. The authors highlighted that the communication between MME and HSS is not secured, as a result, the AV will be in risk. To overcome those issues, an enhanced mechanism called Security Enhanced Authentication and Key agreement (SE-EPS AKA) has been proposed based on Wireless Public Key Infrastructure (WPKI) and ECC (Ellipse Curve Cipher) encryption method. The proposed mechanism has been proofed using formal verification Model. To protect the user identity, the IMSI in SE-EPS-AKA protocol is encrypted using the public key of HSS. In addition to public key, the possible IMSIs 10 10 are known, which leads to a brute force attack.
III. THE PROPOSED EEPS-AKA METHOD
The proposed protocol uses the basics of SPEKE method with some modification to protect the IMSI and generate a strong shared key in the authentication messages exchanged between UE, MME, and HSS. Two random values (u and d) are chosen by UE to generate the key A, which makes the shared key always different even though same values (A u , B m ) are used. The protocol is starting when MME computes its value B and sends it to UE with user identity request message. After that, UE computes its value A using two random values (u and d), and the shared secret key K um using f function, this key is used to protect the IMSI. When MME receives the protected IMSI (PIMSI), it calculates the K um key and forwards it to HSS with other values. HSS and UE can verify each other via the random values computed by K um and K uh keys. To provide perfect forward secrecy, the secret key is used also to compute the generated keys in the later steps such as (IK, CK, MSK). The details of the proposed method is in Figure 4 and the following steps: 1) MME computes B = g m mod p, and attaches B to the user identity request message which sent to UE via eNB. 2) UE computes A = g u d mod p, and uses the received B to compute the symmetric shared key K um = B u mod p which is computed in UE and MME, then it Chooses a random nonce R u , and uses key K um with function f to compute PIMSI, where P IMSI = f Kum (IM SI, Ru), and then, it sends the message A, P IM SI, R u to MME. 3) Upon receipt user identity response message, MME computes the shared key K um = A m mod p, and forwards K um , P IMSI, R u to HSS server. It also computes the shared key K uh , which is computed in UE and HSS, K uh = K um ⊕ K, K is pre-shared key between UE and HSS. 4) The HSS checks the IMSI and retrieves the corresponding key for the UE, It also checks the received value Ru with the value retrieved from PIMSI, then it computes key K uh , which is computed in UE and HSS, K uh = K um ⊕ K, K is pre-shared key between UE and HSS. After that it chooses random value Rh, uses K uh and Rh to generate HSS Verification value (HSSV) and Expected Response (XRES), where HSSV = f 1 Kuh (Ru, Rh) and XRES = f 2 Kuh (Rh), then, it sends HSSV and XRES to MME. 5) MME generates a random value Rm, computes MME Verification value (MMEV), where MMEV = f 1 Kum (HSSV, Rm) and sends the message (MMEV, Rm, Rh) to UE. 6) UE verifies HSSV and MMEV to authenticate HSS server and MME, if matches it generates the RES value, where XRES = f 2 Kuh (Rh) and sends it to MME. 7) MME checks the received RES with the XRES, if matches it sends a success message to UE, otherwise it sends a failure message.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS

A. Proof of Security requirements
1) Mutual authentication: Our proposed protocol provides a strong mutual authentication between UE and HSS. The UE challenges the HSS in the Authentication data request message, with the encryption of his identity (IMSI) by using the secret key computed in HSS. Only the HSS can compute the secret key, hence HSS can retrieve the user identity.
2) User identity protection: In EPS-AKA, since MME sends the message of an identity request to UE, UE must reply with a response message containing its real identity IMSI. Unfortunately, an adversary can get IMSI of UE, by sending an identity request to UE, then he/she can use it for different purposes. The adversary then gets IMSI of UE. In our proposed EESP-AKA protocol, we use a generated secret shared key K um by UE to protect the identity IMSI of MS. The secret shared key is computed based on improved SPEKE, which is considered as one of the strongest authentication methods. The K um key also computed by MME and sent to HSS to decrypt and verify the received IMSI, it also used to compute the shared key K uh . Except MME and UE, nobody can generate the secret key K um . If an adversary sends an identity request to UE to get the IMSI, he/she will not be able to know the IMSI, Even if he eavesdrops A and B values.
3) Signaling Overhead: All steps of the proposed EEPS-AKA protocol are identical to the EPS-AKA.
No additional round-trip delays introduced compared to the original EPS-AKA.
4) MITM attack:
Our proposed protocol is resistant to MITM attack. The user identity cannot be retrieved or altered by the attacker, since it is protected by a strong secret key, only UE and HSS can do. Moreover, the secret key is not transmitted or exchanged either in clear or encrypted text. until the correct key found. In EEPS-AKA protocol, the shared secret key is not exchanged to be vulnerable to brute force attack. In addition, shared keys are computed in a way that makes it difficult to be obtained.
6) Key Hierarchy:
In EEPS-AKA protocol, the key K uh , that computed in UE and HSS can be used for future vertical handover, where no need to compute it again in both UE and the target HSS.
7) Perfect Forward Secrecy:
The EPS-AKA uses symmetric key K shared between the UE and the HSS to provide authentication and key agreement and generate CK, IK, and MSK. The attacker can disclose K, therefore, EPS-AKA does not provide a perfect forward secrecy. In our proposed protocol the secret key which is linked with the long term key K, is used to generate the AKA keys and no one owns it, except UE and HSS, since it is computed separately rather than exchanged.
B. Formal Analysis using AVISPA
AVISPA is a simulation tool that can be used to model and analyze security protocols. The mutual authentication and secrecy property can be examined using AVISPA. In this work, the On-the-fly Model-Checker (OFMC) backend in AVISPA is used to validate the proposed EEPS-AKA. This is mainly due to its interesting features such as supporting various security protocols, checking whether the verified protocol is able to provide strong authentication and secrecy, and the most important feature is that OFMC tries to prove the lack of security in the protocol rather than proving its security. The OFMC also provides details about the attack traces in case it occurs, otherwise its output shows that the protocol is safe. The specifications of EEPS-AKA method is written using HLPSL Figure.5 shows the output of protocol execution in using OFMC tool, which shows that the proposed protocol is secure and the authentication and session keys secrecy goals are achieved.
The goal of this verification is the mutual authentication and secrecy of keys as showed in Figure 6 . K1 represents the secret key computed in UE and HSS. It is a name for secrecy property declared in role UE. K2 represents the session key K ASM E . The keys K1 and K2 are known only to agents UE and HSS in the protocol run. The names of authentication r1 and r2 represent the authentication property declared in roles UE and HSS.
C. Performance Evaluation
Authentication messages size plays a key role in communication overhead, we calculate the size of authentication messages in EEPS-AKA as follows : The total messages size is 1776 bits, compared with authentication protocols in [15] - [16] where the total authentication messages size is 2184 and 1888 bits respectively, EEPS-AKA reduces the communication overhead. Moreover, our proposed protocol is more efficient and faster than proposed protocols in [14] - [17] , since it uses secret key method which is faster than full public key and certificate based methods, this leads to reduce delay and computational overhead.
V. CONCLUSION Despite its safety and efficacy, EPS-AKA does not provide fully protection for LTE networks and it suffers from several drawbacks such as user identity attacks, signalling overhead, and bandwidth consumption. The user identity can be revealed when the IMSI is sent in clear text in the first connection, which leads to user identity attack. In addition, the perfect forward secrecy is not fully provided, since all keys are generated using a single key which could be disclosed and be a weak point of the protocol. Many solutions have been proposed to solve those problems, but there was no perfect solution.
Some of those solutions used full public cryptography which leads to an increase in delay. Unlike the pervious methods, we propose an efficient AKA protocol based on secret key to provide a strong protection to user identity and generate stronger shared key with less computational overhead. AVISPA tool is used to provide a formal verification. The results show that the proposed EEPS-AKA is efficient and secure against active and passive attacks. Future work will be designing an analytical model for the proposed method to proof its efficiency.
